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INTRODUCTION
The retroactive application of a ruling in a criminal case has been
before the United States Supreme Court repeatedly,' but not until
United States v. Peltier2 has the court based a decision on the na-
ture of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule instead of on tra-
ditional retroactivity principles. 3 In concluding that the Court's
previous decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States4 should not
be applied to cases pending on appeal on the date that the decision
was announced, the Court has apparently recognized a new test of
retroactivity for Fourth Amendment rulings and has laid the
groundwork for a new barrier to a defendant's motion to suppress.
The ruling sought to be applied retroactively was the holding that
a warrantless automobile search conducted about 25 air miles from
the Mexican border by border patrol agents acting without probable
cause contravenes the Fourth Amendment prohibition against un-
1. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), involving the retroactivity
of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which had overruled Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), involving
the retroactivity of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which reversed
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968), involving the ret-
roactivity of Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), which overruled Schwartz
v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Desist v. United States 394 U.S. 244 (1969),
involving the retroactivity of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
which rejected Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31(1975), involving the retroactivity of Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975), which overruled Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
2. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
3. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, states that whenever
the Court has formulated a new constitutional principle involving the exclu-
sionary rule, that new principle is not applied retroactively because of the
purposes behind the exclusionary rule. 422 U.S. at 535.
Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, explains this retroactivity procedure as
a result of the sudden change in the law as enunciated in the new consti-
tutional principle. It is a matter of circumstance that the exclusionary rule
is involved at all. 422 U.S. at 544.
4. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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reasonable searches and seizures.5 Four months before this decision,
defendant Peltier was stopped in his automobile about 70 air miles
from the Mexican border by a roving border patrol, and three plas-
tic garbage bags containing 270 pounds of marihuana were found
in the trunk of his car by Border Patrol Agents who were acting
without probable cause. 6 The similarities with the Almeida-San-
chez search were apparent and as Mr. Justice Douglas indicated,
either case could have resulted in the new ruling.7
The Almeida-Sanchez ruling was merely an application of the
Fourth Amendment standards enunciated fifty years earlier in Car-
roll v. United States," permitting the stop and search of a moving
automobile without a warrant provided there is probable cause.9
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Almeida-Sanchez dissent,"° in-
terpreted the prohibition against "unreasonable" searches and sei-
zures as providing a flexible standard of probable cause and empha-
sized 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (3)11 interpreting it as allowing border area
searches by roving patrol with neither warrant nor probable cause.
In Peltier, the Court again dealt with the considerations raised
5. Id. at 273.
6. 422 U.S. at 532. This search clearly falls under the Almeida-Sanchez
standard as conceded by the Government in the Court of Appeals.
7. Id. at 2320.
It is largely a matter of chance that we held the Border Patrol
to the command of the Fourth Amendment in Almeida-Sanchez
rather than in the case of this defendant. Equal justice does not
permit a defendant's fate to depend upon such a fortuity.
8. 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1924).
9. 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973).
10. It is interesting to note that the Almeida-Sanchez dissent comprises
the Peltier majority (with the inclusion of Mr. Justice Powell). Four of
these justices who do not wish to apply the Almeida-Sanchez ruling retro-
actively, in fact, disagree with that ruling. 413 U.S. at 285-99. And note
that the fifth justice, J. Powell, believes that these searches are unconstitu-
tional only because a warrant is not required, yet does agree with the others
that the traditional standard of probable cause is not required. 413 U.S.
at 289.
11. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(a) (3), 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (a) (3).
Any officer or employee of the Service . . shall have power
without warrant-within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search for aliens
any ... vehicle...
The majority construed this statute so as to render it constitutionally con-
sistent with their decision in that it does not eliminate the probable cause
requirement but only the warrant requirement. 413 U.S. at 272.
in the majority and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez to de-
termine if these same considerations required the retroactive appli-
cation of that ruling.
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the Court of Appeals, the retroactivity issue was resolved by
applying the "sharp break" test of whether a new doctrine had been
articulated in Almeida-Sanchez, the case sought to be applied retro-
actively. 12 By requiring the new ruling to constitute a sharp break
in the line of earlier authority, the court prevented the injustice
that would occur if it merely affirmed established constitutional
principles yet did not apply the same principles to cases on appeal
at that time. Thus a sudden change to new law is required. Find-
ing no sudden change in the law, the Court of Appeals interpreted
Almeida-Sanchez as reaffirming well established Fourth Amend-
ment standards and resolved the issue in Peltier's favor.13
The Court of Appeals dissent, however, concluded that Almeida-
Sanchez did indeed establish new doctrine because the decision
overruled a consistent line of Courts of Appeals decisions and dis-
rupted a long accepted and widely relied upon administrative prac-
tice.14 Accordingly, the dissent stated that the issue of retroactivity
should have been decided in accordance with the standards sum-
marized in Stovall v. Denno.15
The Supreme Court majority could have adopted the position of
the dissent in the Court of Appeals decision that a "sharp break"
with past decisions had occurred and could have resolved the issue
12. See e.g., Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Manufacturing Corp., 392
U.S. 481, 499 (1968) (ta sharp break in the line of earlier authority or an
avulsive change which caused the current of the law thereafter to flow be-
tween new banks"); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969) ("a
clear break with the past"); Milton v. Wainright, 407 U.S. 371, 382 n.2(1972) ("a sharp break in the web of the law").
13. "(Respondent) is entitled to the rule announced in Almeida-San-
chez, not because of retroactivity; but because of Fourth Amendment princi-
ples never deviated from by the Supreme Court." 500 F.2d 985, 989 (9th
Cir. 1974).
14. 500 F.2d at 991-93. Border patrol agents had conducted roving
searches pursuant to Congressional authorization, 8 U.S.C. 1357 (a) (3) and
administrative regulation 8 CFR § 287.1 (1973), which according to the dis-
senters had been continuously upheld until the Supreme Court's decision
in Almeida-Sanchez.
15. 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) thepurpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of re-
liance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive ap-
plication of the new standards.
[voL. 3: 386, 1976] United States v. Peltier
PEPPERDIN LAW RLEVIEW
with reference to the Stovall standards without ever reaching an
exclusionary rule issue. If this approach had been taken, discussion
of 8 U.S.C. 1357(a) (3) and the individual Courts of Apppeals cases16
would have been relevant only as to the then existing state of the
law for purposes of determining the narrow "sharp break" issue,
and not for the purpose of determining the justifiable good faith
belief of the border patrol agents.
Comparison of the state of the law before and after a Supreme
Court ruling appears to be no longer determinative of the retroac-
tivity of that ruling, at least in Fourth Amendment cases. This
"sharp break" test now serves a different function; it is the measure
of the arresting officer's justifiable belief in the legality of his or
her actions.
The Court, although apparently believing that a sharp break had
occurred, 1" stated that in Fourth Amendment retroactivity cases the
focus should be on the purposes served by the exclusionary rule:18
Whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied to the
roving border patrol search conducted in this case, then, depends
on whether considerations of either judicial integrity or deterrence
of Fourth Amendment violations are sufficiently weighty to re-
quire that the evidence obtained by the border patrol in this case
be excluded.19
16. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 531, 539-540. The dissent takes
issue with the Court's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1357(a) (3): the statute
"only authorizes searches of vehicles 'without warrant ... within a reason-
able distance of any external boundary'; nothing in the statute expressly
dispenses with the necessity for showing probable cause."
There is also considerable disagreement with the Court's statement that
roving border patrol searches under this statute have been upheld repeat-
edly against constitutional attack:
For the approval by the Courts of Appeals of this law enforce-
ment practice was short-lived, less than unanimous, irreconcilable
with other rulings of the same courts, and contrary to the explicit
doctrine of this Court in Carroll, supra, as reaffirmed in Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1305, 93 L. Ed.
1879 (1949), and other cases. United States v. Peltier, supra at 547.
17. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539-540. See Mr. Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
at 278, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, 413 U.S. at 285-
99.
18. Evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible.
This rule serves two primary purposes-to deter lawless police conduct and
to enable the judiciary to avoid the taint of this lawless conduct if com-
mitted. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. 422 U.S. at 538. The approach in this retroactivity case is quite simi-
In examining the imperative of judicial integrity, the Court noted
that although judicial integrity plays a role in establishing a new
constitutional ruling such as Mapp v. Ohio, it is not concerned with
the retroactive application of that ruling.20 The Court is not
tainted by lawless police conduct if the police themselves were act-
ing in good faith compliance with the then prevailing constitutional
norms,21 nor is lawless police conduct deterred in such a situation:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily as-
sumes that the police have engaged in wilifull, or at the very
least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some
right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating
officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care
toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was
pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale
loses much of its force.22
From this exclusionary rule examination, it appears that Fourth
Amendment rulings can never be applied retroactively because the
deterrence rationale is satisfied by the ruling itself. Retroactive
application only benefits one defendant and has no deterrent effect
on future police conduct. It follows that since lawless police con-
duct is not deterred and the imperative of judicial integrity is not
offended when the law enforcement official acts in good faith, the
entire class of Fourth Amendment cases can not be applied retroac-
tively.23 The significance of the "sharp break" test in this area has
lar to the approach taken generally to the exclusionary rule. See United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974).
20. It is particularly the application of this exclusionary rule purpose
in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Douglas have disagreed with the
current majority of the court. The integrity of the judiciary is offended
if illegally seized evidence is admitted. The good faith belief of the police
officer is irrelevant to the greater issue of judicial involvement in an illegal
search and seizure. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. See Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968) (per curiam), involving
the retroactivity of Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), which overruled
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
22. 422 U.S. at 539 quoting from Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974),
which concerns the good faith reliance of police officers on the Court's deci-
sion in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), particularly focusing on
defendant's opportunity to have retained counsel with him during the inter-
rogation if he chose to do so. 417 U.S. at 447.
23. 422 U.S. at 547. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting:
The Court substitutes at least as respects the availability of the
exclusionary rule in cases involving searches invalid under the
Fourth Amendment, a pre-presumption against the availability of
decisions of this Court except prospectively. The substitution dis-
cards not only the 'sharp break' determinant but also the equally
established principle that prospectivity 'is not automatically deter-
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been relegated to the determination of whether the law enforce-
ment official has acted with a good faith belief in the legality of
his or her conduct.
The Court's analysis of the exclusionary rule reaches beyond this
appellate view of the issue of retroactivity and into the broader
realm of daily police conduct. The Court has given no indication
that an inquiry into the good faith belief of the police officer will
only be relevant in a retroactivity determination as involved here.
Statements near the end of the Court's opinion are worded very
broadly as if applying to any exclusionary rule application.
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be sup-
pressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer
had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge that
the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
24
Again in the Court's final note,2 5 Justice Rehnquist mentions the
dissent's claim that the good faith belief of the police officer must
now be determined by the presiding judge at the motion to sup-
press. This claim should have been dispelled; instead, Justice Rehn-
quist indicated that consideration of such an issue is not inappropri-
ate since courts now spend 'substantial time addressing issues that
do not go to a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. '2 6
CONCLUSION
The Court's specific holding was that the Almeida-Sanchez deci-
sion would not be applied retroactively to defendant's case even
though it was pending on appeal on the date that the decision was
announced. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court has deter-
mined that the primary focus in Fourth Amendment retroactivity
mined by the provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is
based...
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966).
24. 422 U.S. at 542.
25. Id. at 542, n.13.
26. Also note the Court's response to the dissent's claim that the Al-
meida-Sanchez conviction should have been upheld because the officers
there were acting in good faith:
Nor did the Government in Almeida-Sanchez urge upon us any
consideration of exclusionary rule policy independent of the mer-
its of the Fourth Amendment question which we decided adversely
to the Government. Id. at 542 n.12.
determinations should be directed to the purposes of the exclusion-
ary rule and not to any old law-new law considerations. These
considerations in a Fourth Amendment context are relevant only
as to the factual issue of the good faith belief of the law enforce-
ment officials.
Since the Court draws no distinction between its application of
the exclusionary rule in the determination of retroactivity and its
application of the rule in a more general context, it appears that
exclusionary rule principles enunciated in one context may be ap-
plied in another. Stated differently, once an exclusionary rule
principle is formulated it attaches to the rule and will be applied
whenever the rule is applied. The new principle formulated in
United States v. Peltier is that the purposes of the exclusionary
rule are not sufficiently furthered when the law enforcement offi-
cial acts with a good faith belief that his or her conduct is within
the bounds of the presently existing law. When this principle is
applied to the exclusionary rule in a motion to suppress the subtle
importance of the Court's decision is evident: evidence obtained
from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged
with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
Although this new principle comes from a retroactivity case, the
Court appears to be convinced that the exclusionary rule should
no longer be applied in situations where the arresting officer has
done all that could be expected. This issue is presented in two
cases presently before the Court and these do not provide a retroac-
tivity cover to shield the Court's abandonment of the exclusionary
rule in situations where the police officer has acted in good faith.27
27. Stone v. Powell, 507 F.2d 93 (1974) cert. granted. No. 74-1055, June
30, 1975; Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185 (1974) cert. granted, No. 74-1222,
June 30, 1975. In Stone v. Powell, the defendant Powell was convicted of
second-degree murder by the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
California, on evidence obtained from a search incident to an arrest for a
violation of a local vagrancy ordinance subsequently ruled unconstitutional.
Stone v. Powell, supra at 94. Thus the issue before the Supreme Court is
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to suppress fruits of a rea-
sonable search incident to arrest based upon probable cause for violation
of a then valid ordinance.
In Wolff v. Rice, the defendant, Rice, was convicted of first-degree murder
in connection with the bombing death of a police officer, by the District
Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, on evidence obtained from a search
of Rice's home pursuant to an invalid search warrant. Rice v. Wolff, supra
at 188. The issue before the Court is whether the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule should be modified to admit evidence obtained by the good
faith conduct of the police.
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By emphasizing the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule,
it is clear that law enforcement officials are not deterred from law-
less conduct if they can not reasonably be expected to know that
their conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. But this deterrent
effect is not the only purpose served by excluding illegally seized
evidence; there is another consideration-the imperative of judicial
integrity. It is the Court and not the police officer who permits
illegally seized evidence to be used against the defendant, and it
is this principle that seems to have been lost somewhere along the
path from Mapp to Peltier. Those who are not convinced that the
exclusionary rule does not serve a valid purpose can take solace
in the possibility that the criminal may still be able to go free if
the constable should have recognized his blunder.28
RONALD R. TALMo
28. J. Brennan, dissenting, "If a majority of my colleagues are deter-
mined to discard the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they
should forthrightly do so, and be done with it." 422 U.S. at 539.
